

MODES OF ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF ENTREPRENEURIAL PROCESSES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE HETERONOMY OF AN ENTREPRENEURIAL FIELD. AN ANALYSIS WITH REFERENCE TO ALGERIA

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Abstract

The modes of organization and management of entrepreneurial processes are subject to influences and even reactive effects exerted by the overall management of the economy. A historical perspective makes it possible to link this particularity to the entrepreneurial policies pursued at least from the launch of industrialization plans in the early 1970s. The main objective of the analysis is to show that the exogeneity of the logics of reproduction of entrepreneurial processes has powerful effects on their modes of organizational structuring and governance, on the choices of their commitments and on the inter-functional relationships to be maintained between them. On an empirical level, the task consists of reconstituting the organizational and managerial realities of large private groups (NCA ROUIBA, GENERAL EMBALLAGE, SIM, AMOR BENAMOR, etc.), of establishing the structure and origin of their skills and the nature of their strategic movements (diversification or conglomeration strategy, succession or takeover strategies, etc.). The results of the explorations and analysis (historical and qualitative) of entrepreneurial processes are of four types: Low complexity of production functions and inter-functional entrepreneurial relationships in the economy. Also, development of unrelated forms of diversification in the economy in reason for the distrust maintained towards large size at the political level. Additionally, the subordination of the evolution of private capital to the managerial capacities offered by the family space. Finally, with the shift of competition from goods markets towards the spheres of access to regulated entrepreneurial resources.

Keywords: Entrepreneurial Capital, Entrepreneurial Processes, Management Entrepreneurial, Heteronomy, Entrepreneurial Leadership, Entrepreneurial Governance.

1. INTRODUCTION

The organizational analysis of entrepreneurial processes has not apparently been of great interest to researchers in entrepreneurship and management sciences. However, putting the organizational issue at the center of entrepreneurship research is a perspective that could only be effective from an academic point of view and from the questions given by institutions and practical actors.

Indeed, the organizational issues of entrepreneurial dynamics are not perceived in the same way by the actors in the manager-owner, academic and institutional worlds (investment promotion and development mechanisms). If organizational analysis arises in terms of strategic choices and visibility for the actors (creation ex nihilo, choice of diversification, integration, etc.), in terms of conceptual choices and vision principles for theoretical researchers, the interest of governments and institutions involved in the management of entrepreneurial acts is of another order. Beyond the enlargement, valorization and orientation of the entrepreneurial potential of the economy, the question

arises of the intensity and extent of the cross-functional networks which structure the economy.

The organizational structuring of entrepreneurial processes provides an analytical level of view to understand their modes of governance and management, socio-economic contributions and insertion into supply or value creation systems. The purpose of this paper is to provide insights into the effects of interpenetration games between agents belonging to different spaces on the structural orientations of entrepreneurial processes organized according to group-type institutional forms.

2. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

Several studies have focused on the analysis of organization's management (Bourdieu, 1980; Chandler, 1988; Chandler, 1994; Bourdieu, 2000; Marchesnay, 2002; Basso, 2004; Malarewicz, 2006; Koenig, 2006; Basso, 2006; Bouchard, 2009; Bourdieu, 2012; Hjorth, Holt, & Steyaert, 2015; Teece, 2016; Sadoud, 2017 ; Montiel Mendez, & Pelly, 2022; Shore et al, 2024; Melchor-Duran, & Villegas-Mateos, 2024).

The logics of organizational structuring of entrepreneurial capital

The analysis of the modes of management and organization of acts carried out by agents of private capital is a research perspective, which aims to provide answers to the questions of the determinants of the choices of value chains, of the social divisions of management and of directions that entrepreneurial developments are taking in the world of their establishment. The formation of the organizational modes of private capital is transitory in the direction and rhythm of the de-individualization of their management. Intermediate structures are interposed between individual and organizational entrepreneurship, which shape the game of involvement of intra-entrepreneurial relays (potential family buyers).

These intermediations of entrepreneurial achievement, choices as diverse as those of restructuring or strategic movements (extension, integration, diversification, etc.), are projected within the framework of logics of differentiation and integration of the tasks of management. At this higher stage of integration, the social division of entrepreneurial process management poses the problem of the structure of governance relationships in the company. Organizational evolution in private firms, particularly family firms, depends on the boundary between entrepreneurial ownership and management. In the analysis of agency's theory, notably JENNSEN and FAMA, the separation between the functions of management and control is the only guarantee of efficiency in joint stock companies. However, their principles of vision, which arise from methodological individualism and the fragmentation of the utility function of the firm, prevent us from recognizing the hierarchical forms of the structure of the space of the distribution of power in the large particularly a family firm.

Furthermore, the transition from one case of integration to another needs to take place within the limits of the family's entrepreneurial potential. This potential is focused around the ability to undertake and control capital operations (asset allocation, subsidiary

management, etc.). Indeed, in private groups, the supply of entrepreneurial management skills in the family space is built through adapted choices in terms of training. Moreover, agents who are members of the family enter into the management of their company's capital as holders of skills acquired in management schools, sometimes internationally renowned. Furthermore, positional insertion in the managerial space of the family business differs depending on the professional backgrounds and the importance of the experience capital of the contenders. Therefore, the differences are between those who underwent a complete training process before joining the management of the company and those whose training took place after several years of experience.

The “disciplinary” specializations in the management of the family firm are symbolic and ephemeral. The adjustments of primary managerial dispositions to the operating requirements of the family firm take place under the tangential weight of their transfiguration into entrepreneurial capacities. The agent who is a member of the family has, above all, a relationship with the company which is experienced as a link to ownership that legitimizes the content and origin of the training pursued. The passage through the big colleges or business schools is not seen in the perspective of a sort of professionalization of integration into the organizational space of the family firm. Since their integration into the management of family capital, the positions of future successors often involve a managerial de-functionalization of the positions they occupy temporarily.

Obviously, this managerial defunctionalization will precipitate the implementation of a reorganization of the firm's management according to plans favoring resourcing in the labor market for managers. This openness to the outside world is accompanied, in the case of CEVITAL, by the intensive use of coaching. Thus, the success of such a choice would find permissive effects in the symbiotic relationships between the two categories of agents: potential successors and salaried contractual managers. In this way, belonging to the managerial world reduces the effects of informational asymmetries that can be observed in the case where the origins of outsiders are different. It is not a question here of complying with the requirements of a functional organization, but of organizing the managerial function in a context of heteronomy of the entrepreneurial or economic field. The use of coaches frequently follows a desire to internalize relays equipped with effective relationship capital.

Under these conditions, the field of management practice becomes fundamentally transversal thanks to a synergistic use of entrepreneurial and managerial skills falling within the area of intervention of the two categories of agents (insiders and outsiders). In this case, the organizational structuring of entrepreneurial processes in private groups is not the outcome of any transmutation of the functional organization.

Hence, the organizational evolution in private firms has nothing similar to the transition from the hierarchical-functional firm to the divisional firm that Alfred CHANDLER analyzes [...]. The organization and management of the private entrepreneurial process suggests forms of polarization around the founding owner agent to lead, notably under the support of the firm's growth rates, to the pooling of the exercise of entrepreneurial management

of the band. Therefore, the most illustrative case is the restructuring of the CEVITAL group in 2009.

Additionally, the shared management of entrepreneurial processes is a choice that supports a Kirznerian-type entrepreneurial agent. It is structured in a way, on the one hand, to overcome the differences of interest between insiders and outsiders and, on the other hand, to support the entrepreneurial vision of the founder-owners. In the context of coaching, functional solidarity within an entrepreneurial process is made to strengthen responsiveness to circumstances that would cross a national entrepreneurial field. More particularly, this shared management makes it possible for the firm to be informed of developments in the national entrepreneurial field (institutional rearrangements, opportunities offered, access to resources bureaucratically offered, environmental threats, etc.).

Overall, information on the national entrepreneurial field is the most effective resource for potential entrants than for established entrepreneurs. Furthermore, the verticalization of rivalry relationships, which is a consequence of this heteronomy, is supported by strategies of internalization of relays better equipped with relationship capital.




Figure 1: Organizational change in private groups

3. MATERIALS & METHODS

This study is based on the qualitative approach by shedding light on the theoretical analysis that belongs to managerial behavior. This paper has empirically demonstrated that the exogeneity of the logics of reproduction of entrepreneurial processes exerts a significant impact on their modes of organizational structuring and governance, on the choices of their commitments, and on the inter-functional relationships among large private groups such as NCA ROUBA, GENERAL EMBALLAGE, SIM and AMOR BENAMOR.

4. RESULT & DISCUSSION

Entrepreneurial processes are undergoing restructuring in order to address situations of inefficiency faced by companies whose property rights are linked to fragmented leadership. In the context of dilution of entrepreneurial control, leadership conflicts or organizational inertia, which we encounter in entrepreneurial takeovers of family properties, the solutions envisaged would be, as evidenced by the case of the private firms NCA ROUIBA and General EMBALLAGE. Such an internalization of control is established to replace the distrust of control based on property distributed among agents who are equal in rights.

The internalization of a link of control in the large private firm is the preferred path in the case of the absence of a separation between management and control, which moreover justifies the accumulation of functions of the CEO (Chairman-General Director), and in the case of an entrepreneurial focus growth strategy. Ramdane BATOUCHE, who runs GE, and Slim OTHMANI, who runs NCA ROUIBA, they are leaders who are better at controlling things outside of their company. Also, they have a plan to make their organization bigger, which they give to someone outside the company.

In terms of agency relationships, the break-up of the main result is faults of an incentive nature which could not be corrected without making the company bear obligation costs. When the effects of leadership are not what they are on the partnership and public relations space (the case of Slim OTHMANI), the solution may take the form of attempting a stock market listing to reconfigure the structure of ownership rates in the capital of the family firm in his favor. However, the resurgence of situations of cultural or organizational inertia could find its favorable breeding ground if cyclical or structural factors limit its rate of growth. The downward trend taken by the evolution of the drinks market was another factor to drive its exit from the Algiers Stock Exchange and its acquisition by CASTEL.

Further, in certain private groups, the organizational effectiveness of an entrepreneurial process is obtained through the acquisition of managerial resources with distinctive skills. Usually, these are agents equipped with a dispositional system which enables them to manage an entire supply system. Apart from the technical skills mastered by the outsider agent in the viewfinder of the private group, there is a sense of relational or more generally entrepreneurial play developed in his previous experiences. In the entrepreneurial game in which the group has embarked, the agent possessing such a system of entrepreneurial capacities for a strong reason, is seen as a "joker", a trump card assuming the whole range of practical commitments that requires entrepreneurial management of a subsidiary or firm.

In one of its successful entrepreneurial acts, we draw attention to the deployment of the AMOR BENAMOR group from the upstream of the tomato industry. The implementation of its integration strategy consisted of the development of an agricultural sector by using effective entrepreneurial capital (technical, relational and intangible resources) held by an agent from the agricultural sector. Indeed, endowed with specific abilities mastered through his professional experiences and his passage through one of the institutions promoting and supervising agricultural entrepreneurship (Chamber of Agriculture of

Guelma), Messaoud CHEBBAH is committed to taking in charge of the group's new agricultural development subsidiary. For this agent, it was:

- The valorization of technical potential developed as part of its entrepreneurial experiences in the sector. He was a pioneer for having revolutionized planting processes in the industrial tomato segment.
- To overcome the resistance from the world of local agricultural agents who continue to be attached to systems of traditional entrepreneurial arrangements. The challenge was to get these agents to implement new planting and irrigation techniques, to use high-yield seeds as well as new harvesting techniques.
- The commitment as "commander in chief" that Joseph SHUMPETER embodies, this "faculty of acting on others" which is all the more efficient since the agent Messaoud CHEBBAH is an agent who has succeeded in rallying a workforce that has deserted the sector. The reputations acquired among professionals and ministerial officials have had permissive effects on the involvement of farmers in the region.
- The development of inter-entrepreneurial contractual relationships: Farmers and other entrepreneurs involved in the field of tomato collection and transport are engaged on the basis of contractual forms.

The methods of organization and management of entrepreneurial processes which promote, through an integrative desire, a family origin are the work of private firms, like the HASNAOUI Group of Companies. The organization of the construction of the entrepreneurial profile is done from below and is orchestrated within the framework of learning in the two senses of mastery of the profession and the acquisition of a capital of partnership relations (suppliers, institutions supervising sectoral developments). This type of strategy for organizing entrepreneurial learning follows a logic of sustenance and the transmission of family leadership. Leadership and the consecrations which are the springs of its accumulative process are integrated into the framework of the entrepreneurial exercise, considered at the scale of the different segments of the group's portfolio of activities and the local realities with which they interact.

Meanwhile, the diplomas, contents and origin of the training are necessary for the entrepreneurial life of a group, whose strategic ambition remains the diversification of activities, but is not sufficient to obtain recognition which is for a strong partnership and state reason. The adjustment of primary capital to the requirements of the functioning of the entrepreneurial configuration of belonging is a temporally decisive sequence for learning to be an entrepreneur in a sectoral and local context. In this process of building entrepreneurial leadership, the pioneers reinvest themselves in their role of coaching, advisors, supervisors, to indicate the "one best way" of the family entrepreneurial vision, for multiplier, in the words of Pierre de BOURDIEU, their "educational interventions" (the credibility of a judgment by pairs in a family context does not depend only on the successes in the entrepreneurial life of the pioneers, but also on the values shared by all the members of the family), to integrate the family agent to be promoted in an established network of business relations.

Access to the rank of entrepreneurial leaders involves overcoming an adjustment barrier through which the aspirations of future successors are brought back to their real conditions of success. Thus, leadership learning, which begins with a phase of mastery of a profession and a capital of relationships, continues by integrating into logics of mastery of technological developments. The approach would consist of integrating into the partnership management of joint companies, set up with foreign firms, agents who are members of the family who have passed their test in the first phases of entrepreneurial structuring of a subsidiary of the group. The strategies of access to new supply systems, of appropriation of the operating logics and of the technological routines which particularize them are carried out within frameworks of choice of bringing together firms and efficient actors (large firms sometimes leaders in their sectors, research laboratories and individual and associative actors).

However, in this inheritance perspective, potential candidates for taking over the family business are not limited in their entrepreneurial construction to the appropriation of professions chosen and managed by the founding fathers of the group. Leadership is never obtained in the same way, through a sort of dispossession of pioneering leaders of what they had as capital of knowledge and recognition, but through dynamic learning within the framework of chosen partnership spaces. A look at the development strategies of the HASNAOUI Group of Companies makes it possible to identify the logic of building entrepreneurial leadership among second and third generation agents:

- Taking the role of the development choices of an agricultural subsidiary by Ali HASNAOUI, the eldest son of the founding father Brahim HASNAOUI, was initially a dispositional question. Being granted entrepreneurial choice is an element which denotes the margins of entrepreneurial freedom enjoyed by the candidates for succession in this group.
- The company offers innovative pioneering options by installing multi-space greenhouses, with a capacity of 50 million plants, dedicated to plant production for individual customers and institutions in the horticultural market.
- The creation of research centers to explore into the technical and organizational bases of certain particular crops, resulting from scientific and technical developments in biotechnology. Also, the founding of the Algerian-Spanish center, Partisano-Biotech Algeria, for the development of micro-algae cultivation aimed at the production of livestock feed, was part of the same strategic perspective and the inheritance future of the band. The entrepreneurial investment which is a gradual connection of Brahim HASNAOUI's second son with the ready-to-use mortar production segment is the second entrepreneurial experience in the family group. Omar HASNAOUI was the main craftsman in the act of creating the mortar factory. His skills in IT and management have enabled him to undertake work to modernize the group's management. The subsequent broadening of his skills to the field of building chemistry prepared him for the management of two companies in the group: Technachem (2005), which is an Algerian-Italian company, and Grupopuma (in 2010), which is an Algerian-Spanish company.

The strategy of transmission of leadership and family property follows a logic of formation of a dispositional system, as stated by Pierre Bourdieu. The incorporation of specific provisions or the ethos of an entrepreneurial life in a family environment concerned the internalization of rules of conduct and the sharing of specific permissive values. At that point, everything else is a matter of complementarities in the exercise of overall entrepreneurial management of the group.

4.1. The structural particularities of the management and organization of entrepreneurial processes

Methods of organizing and managing entrepreneurial processes are subject to refractions exerted by the structural characteristics of the national entrepreneurial formation. However, the type of formation that the national entrepreneurship field has taken is a historical and political construction that has ended up creating permanent structural elements of decision-making elements that are always working and in the entertainment to be reshaped or reinvented, reaffirmed and completed in order to maintain a particular state policy or entrepreneurial system.

4.2. The rental spring of “entrepreneurialization” of the economy

The entrepreneurial history of independent Algeria shows that the planned mode of entrepreneurial management has experienced two stages in its imposition as a transcendental order on the scale of the entire economy. The first phase refers to the predominance of the public sector, consecrated by the planned choices of the development of state industrial entrepreneurship in the 1970s. The second stage is this decision to integrate private capital into centralized planning taken at the beginning of the 1980s. The planned supervision of public and private entrepreneurial dynamics will leave borrowings on the entrepreneurial management of the economy, the effects of which are still being felt, despite the efforts displayed with the introduction of market mechanisms of allocation and coordination of resources. Indeed, the survival of the structural particularities imprinted by this planned entrepreneurial model still remains at work. The reason for their permanence deserves consideration, in order to identify their significance, analyze them and account, on the one hand, for the types of shaping that it imprints on the strategic behavior of entrepreneurial agents, particularly private ones, and, on the other hand, modes of organization and management of the entrepreneurial processes on which it exercises its determinations.

The subordination of the destiny of entrepreneurial forces to the will of the proponents of the rent-seeking logic of the economy. The renter's logic is at the heart of the functioning of the State, the overall entrepreneurial configuration and society. It configures the logics of reproduction in the economy by distributing purchasing authority, which is constituted thanks to the surplus generated by oil and gas activity. In an economy dependent on external markets to meet the needs for raw materials and components, the exogeneity of the reproduction of productive and entrepreneurial logics presupposes control over the choices of areas of accumulation and their developments. The institution of investment authorizations or approval from the competent authorities (OSCIP, in the 1980s, National Investment Council, which is still operational, etc.) denotes the a priori existence of a

desire to voluntarily structuring of the nation's portfolio of activities, even if this could not be done without the exercise of discretionary power over entrepreneurial freedoms.

The functional complexes, which characterize entrepreneurial networks within the framework of a certain social division of the global entrepreneurial act and which find relatively free rein in an autonomous national entrepreneurial configuration, become vertical in our case to establish themselves between entrepreneurial agents and bureaucratic space. The dependence on purchasing powers managed by the State according to a redistributive logic of rent induces a shift in competition from the goods market, particularly of the industrial type, to take the form of intense rivalry between agents for access to the means of external payments. The shift in competition from the goods market to that of capital is a game between actors and firms, analyzed by Karl Marx through his notion of centralization of capital.

As a result of the concentration of previously competitive markets, there is a dynamic of pooling of capital to give rise to larger companies. In the case of an economy with a redistributive logic, centralization takes the form of a monopolization of the purchasing power of the economy by the profit-seeking State and in no way induces dynamics of rapprochement between firms or entrepreneurial actors. One of the salient facts of such centralization is that it maintains firms beyond a size which will influence the economic decision of the State (this observation can be found in doctrinal texts, notably in the Charter of (1976). The monopoly on the purchasing power of entrepreneurial structures plays the same role as the meta-capital analyzed by Pierre BOURDIEU. The monopoly on the capital of the economy operates through this monopoly established by the capitalist State on the purchasing powers of the economy. What is paradoxical is that control over the reproduction of entrepreneurial processes is a form of minimizing the need for reproduction of the State. In other words, the management of entrepreneurial capital in the economy is not subordinated to a reproduction of the State, but rather, it is a question of making the logic of reproduction of private capital depend on the willingness of the State.

With all that, the purchasing powers mobilized through the games of vertical relationships are not dedicated only to the value creation segments, which symbolize the entrepreneurial vocations of private capital. In fact, we observe a hybridization of the entrepreneurial function of industrial agents. Indeed, the functional duality which characterizes entrepreneurial processes, due to their dual existence, as industrialists and importers, reflects a certain duplication in the entrepreneurial commitments of private agents. Thus, it means that firms or private groups integrate markets or their fields of enterprise astride one foot in the sphere of transformation (enhanced activities) and another in the importation of goods whose value would be very close to the value use of goods obtained through their own productive capacities.

The entrepreneurial governance of the rentier State is also exercised through the allocation of reified resources, including industrial or entrepreneurial land more broadly and specialized media spaces. The limitations of the state supply of specific spatial resources (land bases located inside or outside physical entrepreneurial spaces: activity

zones, industrial zones) have effects on the volume dimension of entrepreneurial investments. The allocations of these resources do not take into account the nature of the entrepreneurial fields which have been the subject of requests for approval and the international competitiveness standards associated with them. Besides, the method of allocating entrepreneurial land always falls short of the ambitions of the requesting private capital agents. Furthermore, the obstacle to deepening and broadening specialization or even achieving global scale in current business segments forces investors to redirect their entrepreneurial potential towards new markets. The growth strategies of private firms then take the form of diversified commitments in segments unrelated to the business segments hitherto under their control.

Furthermore, if the scope of the activities carried out by the subsidiaries is not aligned with the requirements of competitiveness, which is in line with the will of the State, which seeks to limit entrepreneurial positions in the economy, the scope of the group will grow in size to reach levels that irritate the authorities in charge of State entrepreneurial policy. As an illustration, the notion of group in the local semantic context has nothing similar to the meanings shared by the academic world. The group bears the name formed by the initials of the names of the founders (like GMC for the Madani Cheikh Group present in the school items sector), or the initials of the commercial name (like SIM of Taieb EZZERAÏMI for the Semolerie Industrielle de la Mitidja) or limited to the family name of the founders (GSH for Hasnaoui Companies Group).

In these circumstances, the level of dispersion of activities controlled by the local private group is so high as to prevent one from questioning the consequences of functional inconsistencies on the management of its portfolio of activities. The size of the group is considered through a logic of summing the dimensions of its subsidiaries. The limitations imposed by government entrepreneurial management on the sizes of subsidiaries are compensated by the increase in the volume of the group's overall capital. Economic power is then reconsidered at the level of the overall volume of the group's entrepreneurial commitments, and the same concerns immediately resurface towards large size.

The increase in economic or entrepreneurial power with the increase in the overall size of private groups and the internationalization of private capital despite the still existing ban on transferring funds abroad, will fuel doubts about the effectiveness of subordinating economic power to the private sector (businessmen to political authority).

4.3. Modes of organization and management of entrepreneurial processes facing the refractions of the established entrepreneurial order.

The relationships between entrepreneurial agents and the bureaucratic field or the authorities responsible for entrepreneurial management of the economy are a result of the interplay of interpenetration or even relational strategies concocted by actors with group entrepreneurial forms with a view to influencing State decisions. As well as to relatively establish "power over the power of the State", according to the formula of Max Weber.

These interpenetrations have consequences on the organizational and managerial configuration of entrepreneurial processes:

- The internalization of efficient relays. Entrepreneurial relays are satellite forces which intervene between entrepreneurs and efficient agents and institutions of the state space responsible for entrepreneurial management of the economy. They act by proxy to achieve the social demand expressed by their constituents: obtaining entrepreneurial resources (land bases, approvals, registration which is a critical entrepreneurial resource in pharmaceutical entrepreneurship, etc.), influencing decisions or government entrepreneurial policy, protect yourself from certain measures. Furthermore, when reaching the end of his own power, the entrepreneur could be forced to open his field of power or management to outside agents endowed with relational and symbolic capital that they have constructed from the positions that they have occupied in the bureaucratic field.
- The hybridization of entrepreneurial orientations of a functional nature of agents. Obviously, in the context of the heteronomy of the national entrepreneurial space, the consistencies of the supply systems or the activity portfolios of private firms are not built on the basis of the internal determinations of the systems' entrepreneurial dispositions of the agents. On the contrary, these consistencies are generated with the balance of vertical interrelationships. Depending on the weight of the entrepreneurial power of the potential investor agent and the weight of the additional power of the relays acting on his behalf, entrepreneurial interests consist of attempting to control activities relating to the world of food safety or more frequently sectors forming the preferred locations for a growth regime driven by public spending (construction in particular). In this order of facts, the conglomeration of entrepreneurial strategies are unrelated avenues of diversification, responding much more to the capture of purchasing powers on markets supported or subsidized by the State than to the desire to exploit the entrepreneurial potential of the agent.¹
- Growing interest in supporting entrepreneurial forms: Additional entrepreneurial acts, as complements of activities that are added to the agent's basic portfolio, are the emanation of the bivalence of systems of entrepreneurial dispositions. The formation of "torn habitus", in the words of Pierre BOURDIEU, is the product of contractions in forms of entrepreneurial expansion and restrictions on freedom of initiative which impose entrepreneurial governance, particularly on agents with entrepreneurial potential. Obviously, the stronger the refractions, the stronger the tendency towards the financialization of entrepreneurial processes.
- The development of forms of ostentatious spending: The deployment of surplus resources outside the entrepreneurial paths of value creation is at the origin of the product of the investment caps and the prohibition placed on the diversification strategies retained in the system of 1982. The surpluses generated through approved activities are redirected towards expenditure on the construction of buildings and other goods for domestic use (high-end cars, etc.).

- The development of legitimation strategies: The strategies of legitimization and protection of entrepreneurial properties do not induce ruptures in the accumulation processes nor expansions in the structure of the activity portfolios of private groups. The entrepreneurial agents who concoct them use them as weapons to escape or fight against the strategies of discredit that arise in the media domain. The creation of newspapers or television channels by private groups falls within this framework. The same goes for the creation or affiliation of employers' unions (the Forum of Business Leaders, etc.). Legitimization strategies can also consist of publicizing the missions of groups as job creators or exporters. The transfiguration of entrepreneurial capital into "symbolic capital" here responds to the requirements for the constitution of collective recognitions in a context of deficits of trust vis-à-vis public authorities or at least of lack of credibility of state entrepreneurial recognitions.

4.4. Disconnecting property from functions entrepreneurial activities which were to be associated with the possession of capital in the economy.

Property is not specific to the rights attached to the possession of capital. First, capital is often presented as a confused monolithic block and excessively reduced to the financial dimension alone. However, entrepreneurial acts (of business creation, expansion, integration and diversification) are the product of a certain structure and a certain volume of effective capital. These different acts are accomplished through connections between agents, who have a certain relative control, and an entrepreneurial space or a market that pre-exists them. The success of these acts requires the possession of a specific resource distribution structure (financial, relational, technical, organizational, informational, etc.).

Then, to the efficiency of entrepreneurial capital, we must add the entrepreneurial context in which capital commitments are made. The autonomy of an entrepreneurial space means the existence of its own operating logic, far from the injunctions that characterize heteronomous positional configurations. In such a framework of entrepreneurial exercise, ownership (of capital, a business or an operation) is dedicated to the economy which is ultimately its legitimate owner.

Finally, in the case of a heteronomous space, the alterations that entrepreneurial properties undergo on the part of owner agents and the interventionist State can result in the disappearance of companies. Breaks in entrepreneurial trajectories, as observed in the private passenger transport sector, the beverage sector, in the leather industry, in the artisanal production sector (traditional semolina and oil mills), find their origins in the combined effects of several constraints:

- The absence of institutional mechanisms for organizing takeover strategies or entrepreneurial successions: Everything happens as if there is a desire to control developments in entrepreneurial capital and to ensure the sustainability of the organizational forms of their integration (companies, agricultural operations, etc.). The transferability of entrepreneurial capital is made difficult in the absence of the organization of a capital market.

- Divisions of assets as an expression of the desire of the heirs to the autonomy of the family entrepreneurial space: The dispositional discordance of agents who are eligible for succession are often resolved by the sharing of family assets. The disappearance of the company, if it is not caused by a phenomenon of joint ownership, is the consequence of the loss of coherence in the structure of the arrangement of the portfolio of inherited resources.
- The prevalence of the entrepreneurial spirit over the entrepreneurial spirit: Most of the inertia in entrepreneurial change in the field of agricultural and livestock activities is due to the close relationship that exists between capital and labor, that is to say the absence of a division entrepreneurial social and more particularly to the non-integration of entrepreneurial capital into established institutional forms (business or exploitation).

This primacy of the entrepreneurial spirit over the entrepreneurial spirit is also the factor which is at the origin of the expansion of the informal sector in the economy. The informal entrepreneurial agent is an agent who lives under deprivation in entrepreneurial distinction. The accumulation of symbolic capital which worries the competent government authorities is that which would be the work of agents renowned for their formally known positions on industrial markets. The political legitimacy that arises from entrepreneurial reputations is ineffective since the legal framework in place prohibits national entrepreneurs from seeking parliamentary mandates or other positions in the institutional hierarchy (presidency, senate, etc.).

4.5. The structural specificities of private groups

The logic of organizational structuring develops at the rate of the fragmentation of the entrepreneurial capital of private companies. However, this characteristic has not been adopted by companies in their more recent developments. Paying attention to the different levels of development of the national entrepreneurial space highlights structural permanence's in the functioning of companies and the economic field as a whole. For example, there is a structural homology between the structure of distribution of entrepreneurial forces during the colonial era and the structure of distribution of entrepreneurial forces at the independence of Algeria. The "indigenous" entrepreneurial fringe was to the colonial entrepreneurial universe the way it was the private sector to the predominant public sector, constituted by means of nationalization or creative investments.

5. CONCLUSION

The erogeneity of the logics of reproduction of entrepreneurial processes in the rentier and redistributive economy generates particular organizational forms and entrepreneurial network structures. At the organizational level, the perspective of the functional firm is duplicated by types of management organized around external agents equipped with effective relational resources. The management by proxy exercised by relays endowed with relational capital with the bureaucratic field is successively the displacement of competing rivalries that one could have observed, at least for a greater part, on the goods market if the heteronomy of the national entrepreneurial configuration did not constrain

the entrepreneurial games that take place there. Among the major issues at the heart of these relational games are the controls of entrepreneurial resources offered or guaranteed by the State (industrial land, etc.) and purchasing powers to access markets for raw materials and components as well as technological resources and obtaining investment authorizations (approvals). The strengthening of these constraints, which find their origins in the institutional mechanisms put in place previously, within the framework of the planning of public and private entrepreneurial investments, has given way to the anchoring of two forms of organization of entrepreneurial processes:

- The extroversion of entrepreneurial networks: The low complexity of production functions and the productivity orientation of state entrepreneurial policies lead to severe restrictions on the development of intra-entrepreneurial networks in the economy.
- The conglomeration of entrepreneurial processes: The reinvestment of surpluses in private capital circles and the deployment of purchasing powers granted by the State take place within the framework of so-called unrelated diversification strategies. The reduction in the volumes of capital commitments in the subsidiaries of the private group stems from a certain distrust displayed by the government authorities in large scale.
- The heteronomy of the entrepreneurial space and the dependence of private capital, among other things, on surplus means of external payment redistributed by the State, present themselves in the form of a relationship of concomitant rendering the balance of relationships between private entrepreneurial forces and the state possible. This heteronomy, materialized by the restrictive provisions of state entrepreneurial management in place (prohibition of transfers of funds abroad, limitation of commitments to their initial level in the original segments, etc.), induces effects of contraction and thinning of entrepreneurial processes. As a result, the weakening of the "transformation potential", in the words of Norbert ELIAS, of the resulting national entrepreneurial configuration and which is illustrated by the absence of both global sizes in the economy and of firms operating according to logics of own reproduction makes entrepreneurial or more generally economic change uncertain.

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